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SYMPOSIUM
THE PATH OF THE LAW 100 YEARS LATER: HOLMES'S
INFLUENCE ON MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Anthony J. Sebokt
On November 15, 1996, Brooklyn Law School held a
conference commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of
Oliver Wendell Holmes's landmark essay, The Pathof the Law.
The conference, entitled The Path of the Law: One Hundred
Years Later, brought together a distinguished group of legal
scholars from across North America and the Atlantic to
evaluate Holmes's influence on jurisprudence in the United
States and Europe. The Brooklyn Law Review is honored to
publish the conference presentations in this special symposium
issue. This collection of articles offers extraordinary insight
into the jurisprudential mind of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
The Path of the Law, originally delivered as a speech on
January 8, 1897, is generally considered to have heralded the
beginning of the modern era of American jurisprudence. When
Holmes delivered this address in Boston he had just passed the
midpoint of what would turn out to be a remarkable life.
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Holmes, who lived from 1841 to 1935, was a unique figure in
American law. He came of age in the Jacksonian era, he fought
in the Civil War as a young soldier, and before he died he had
witnessed both the birth of the New Deal in America and
fascism in Europe. After an illustrious career as a lawyer,
professor, and a state supreme court justice in Boston, Holmes
served on the United States Supreme Court for thirty years,
where he wrote over 2,000 opinions, including some of the
Court's most famous and prophetic dissents. Clearly, Holmes
was more than a witness to histor r. He was one of those
important figures who brought law into the twentieth century,
both through his work as a judge and as a theorist.
Throughout his long career, Holmes left a lasting legacy in
his tough-minded and path breaking studies of the history and
philosophy of law. Holmes has been called the patron saint of a
wide range of the most influential jurisprudential movements
of our time, from legal realism, to pragmatism and law and
economics. The articles in this symposium reflect the diversity
of Holmes's audiences and influences.
The first article, based on the conference's keynote address
by Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, offers five questions about Holmes. Judge Posner
offers these questions as a framework within which to organize
our judgements about Holmes's life and thought. He asks us to
recognize that Holmes was a complex thinker whose brilliance
sometimes led him to profound yet inconsistent conclusions.
Judge Posner asks the modern reader to resist the temptation
to judge Holmes according to contemporary political and social
tastes. Holmes, argues Judge Posner, must be measured "with
reference to his own contemporaries." According to Judge
Posner's test, Holmes remains one of America's greatest judges
and legal theorists.
The next four articles are based on presentations from the
first half of the conference, which focused on Holmes's
influence on American jurisprudence. In Plotting "The Path of
the Law," Professor Thomas C. Grey of Stanford Law School
reads Holmes's essay as a work of literature, with a plot and a
complex rhetorical structure. By applying the tools of law and
literature, Professor Grey discovers in Holmes's essay a
thematic structure that argues for a philosophically
sophisticated form of legal pragmatism. Thus, by approaching
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The Path of the Law as a Bildungsroman, Professor Grey
identifies three separate and mutually supportive theses in the
essay. For Professor Grey, Holmes is a subtle and gifted
literary stylist whose writings possess many of the same
qualities as a great work of fiction.
In Old-FashionedPostmodernism and the Legal Theories
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Professor Catharine Pierce
Wells of Boston College Law School argues that there are
many similarities between Holmes's early twentieth century
pragmatism and the new forms of postmodern pragmatism
that have influenced contemporary legal theory. Professor
Wells closely examines the pragmatism of Charles Pierce, and
finds a similar form of "viewpoint dependency" in both Pierce
and Holmes. Professor Wells then argues that lessons from
classical pragmatism may help contemporary postmodernists
answer recurring and difficult questions about subjectivity,
power, and pluralism. Thus, for Professor Wells, Holmes's
brand of philosophical skepticism may help to resolve some of
the problems confronting jurisprudence today.
In Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's
Lochner Dissent, Professor G. Edward White of the University
of Virginia argues that Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New
York1 has been misunderstood by modern scholars. According
to Professor White, Holmes's position, which later scholars
would come to describe as a rejection of "substantive due
process," was quite idiosyncratic. Rather than representing the
winning side of the debate resolved by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
2 Holmes's approach to the Due Process Clause did not
Parrish,
become part of mainstream constitutional discourse until after
the New Deal. For Professor White, Holmes is a strikingly
modern figure who anticipated the temper of an America which
had not yet been born.
In his commentary, The Dragon in the Cave, Professor
Gary Minda of Brooklyn Law School responds to Professors
Grey, Wells, and White. Professor Minda notes that the
professors' articles present the reader with a contradictory set
of choices: was Holmes a pragmatist, a classical/old-fashioned
postmodernist, or a modernist? Professor Minda argues that
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198 U.S. 45 (1905).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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Holmes would find the confusion surrounding our attempts to
find ourselves in him quite predictable. Holmes, Professor
Minda suggests, would think that if we were really to emulate
him, we should look at our past-including Holmes's work
itself-more critically.
The last four articles are based on presentations made
during the second half of the conference, which focused on
Holmes's relationship with English and German jurisprudence.
In When Trying is Failing: Holmes's "Englishness," Dr. Neil
Duxbury of the University of Manchester argues that the
extraordinary influence of The Path of the Law is a
consequence of the style with which Holmes presented his
ideas. Dr. Duxbury argues that the essay holds the attention of
the modern American reader because Holmes adopted what
might be called an "English" style of argument. According to
Dr. Duxbury, the English style of legal scholarship is laconic,
free of jargon, and lightly footnoted. By focusing on Holmes's
"Englishness," Dr. Duxbury gives us another perspective on
Holmes's genius while also letting us see ourselves in a new
light.
In Holmes and Carl Schmitt: An Unlikely Pair?,Professor
David Dyzenhaus of the University of Toronto argues that
Holmes's positivism shares a common foundation with the
authoritarian jurisprudence of Carl Schmitt. Carl Schmitt, who
taught law during both the Weimar and Nazi eras, used his
considerable intellectual talents to defend the legitimacy of
Hitler's political and legal systems. Professor Dyzenhaus draws
Holmes and Schmitt together by relating both to Thomas
Hobbes. Hobbes's solution to the problem of the state of nature
requires that individuals accept the authority of a sovereign
who could impose order through law. According to Professor
Dyzenhaus, legal positivism cannot escape its Hobbesian
origins and hence the positivist must accept the legitimacy of
evil sovereigns as well as good ones. Therefore, Professor
Dyzenhaus suggests that we think carefully about how much of
Holmes's positivism we want to embrace.
In Other People's Power: The Bad Man and English
Positivism, 1897-1997, Professor William Twining of University
College London argues that the "bad man"--Holmes's famous
rhetorical device in The Path of the Law-has been a badly
misunderstood feature of modern legal positivism. Professor
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Twining exposes four ways in which the metaphor of the "bad
man" has been read uncharitably by Holmes's critics, and he
then offers a corrective reading. He also argues that Holmes's
"bad man" still has a salutary role to play in contemporary
jurisprudence, since positivism can help scholars to analyze
how power is distributed in a complex legal system. For
Professor Twining, Holmes's "bad man" is a vital and useful
tool for the modern analytical and sociological legal theorist.
In his commentary, Style and Skepticism in The Path of
the Law, Professor John C.P. Goldberg of Vanderbilt
University School of Law responds to Dr. Duxbury and
Professors Dyzenhaus and Twining. Since Professor Goldberg
agrees almost entirely with Professor Twining's argument,
Professor Goldberg's article focuses mostly on the arguments of
Dr. Duxbury and Professor Dyzenhaus. Professor Goldberg
questions the very possibility of separating style from
substance, and he argues that the somewhat negative picture
of Holmes that Dr. Duxbury produces does not match the
agnostic tone of his argument. Professbr Goldberg next argues
that Professor Dyzenhaus's attempt to link Holmes and
Schmitt is based on the erroneous assumption that all legal
positivists must be moral skeptics. Professor Goldberg argues
that there is no necessary connection between positivism and
moral skepticism, and, furthermore, that Holmes's "modest
skepticism" should not be misunderstood as moral skepticism.
As the above synopses demonstrate, the organizers of this
symposium were very lucky. The extraordinary scholars who
we brought together chose to write about the same deep and
important questions. As a result, the articles in this
symposium speak across the pages to each other. In this sense,
these printed words capture the spirit of the conference held
on November 15, 1996, which was marked by a rich and full
discussion between the symposiasts and a very lively and
engaged audience. I am very proud to have been associated
with this project, and I would like to thank the authors for
their hard work and patience during the editing process. I
would also like to thank Dean Joan G. Wexler and Brooklyn
Law School for providing the support--financial, moral, and
intellectual-that made the conference possible. Finally, I
would like to thank the members of the Brooklyn Law Review
in Volumes 62 and 63 for their diligence and professionalism.

